Some indicators show that Syria has
finally started to reconcile with the USA and the rest of the
world. The road to normalization is still very long, however,
and Syria needs a lot of pragmatism if it wants to stick by its
convictions, yet appease the USA to avoid a head-on-clash with
Washington. Over the past two weeks, former friends of Damascus
like British Prime Minister Tony Blair, his Foreign Minister
Jack Straw, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and French
President Jacque Chirac, have all pitched in with President
George W. Bush, telling the Syrians to leave Lebanon. Many are
speculating that the USA will deal with Syria's presence in
Lebanon like it dealt with Iraqi presence in Kuwait in 1991. The
widely-read Syrian journalist Ibrahim Hamidi wrote in the
London-based al-Hayat saying that in 1991, Saddam believed that
the USA would invade Iraq, regardless if he withdrew the Iraqi
Army from Kuwait or not. The situation in Syria is totally
different and the USA will not strike at Syria, nor does it want
to topple the Syrian regime. George Bush wants to change
policies of the Baathist regime in Damascus, and not, the Syrian
regime in itself. Among Syria's gestures, signaling that it
wants to cooperate with America and avoid such an outcome, are
tight control on the Syrian-Iraqi border, extraditing wanted
ex-officials of the Iraqi Baath Party from Syria, supporting the
Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts, starting to withdraw the
Syrian Army from Lebanon, and permitting the resignation of the
pro-Syrian cabinet of Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karameh.
Many in Syria has been calling on
President Bashar al-Asad to follow the strategy: "Syria First"
although it contradicts with the ideology of the ruling Baath
Party, which emphasis, "Arabism First." 'He (Asad) should do
what it takes to preserve Syria' is a phrase being heard all
over Damascus. It should replace the Baath Party motto: " One
united Arab world with an eternal message" and the trinity of
"Unity, Freedom, and Socialism" that Syrians have been
indoctrinated with since 1963. It is this trinity, and the
notion of "Arabism First" that brought Syria to the troubled
situation it is in today. For the better part of the 20th
century, Syria has involved itself, often crazily and
needlessly, in Arab affairs, often damaging its own interests
for those of the greater Arab World, as part of its commitment
to Arab nationalism. This was the case even before the Baath
Party came to power in March 1963. The policy "Arabism First" is
now dead, among public and government alike. Ironically, its
leading advocate, the pragmatic President Hafez al-Asad, was the
man to first turn against it in 1980 when he sided with Iran in
its war against Iraq, and in 1991 when he went to war with the
USA against Iraq. His decision was "Syria First" par excellence,
getting him on the good side of Washington as the USSR was
falling apart, getting the USA to launch the Arab-Israeli peace
process at Madrid, and giving him a green light to establish a
pro-Syrian regime in Lebanon, and oust Army Commander Michel
Aoun. The Syrian regime today should learn from Hafez al-Asad
and do what it takes to maintain "Syria First" even if sadly,
this would be at the expense of its interests in Lebanon, Iraq,
and Palestine. "Syria First" means bowing before the storm that
is heading towards Syria at monumental speed, and at this stage,
doing what it takes to please the neo-cons at the White House.
Some might call it weakness, others might say it is abandoning
Arab nationalism, but to the average Syrian, it would be great
conventional wisdom. It is this average Syrian who will suffer
if war breaks out in Syria, therefore, he/she are the ones
entitled to say what suits Syria most. "Syria First" they are
saying all over Syria, and apparently, Asad has heard their
calls, and is responding promptly.
During the first Arab-Israeli War of
1948, the leaders of Syria faced a dilemma that greatly
resembles the one facing President Bashar al-Asad today. They
asked: do we accept the reality that we are unable to face the
storm heading towards Syria? Meaning, we abandon our commitments
to Palestine, accept the UN Partition Plan of 1947, and raise
the slogan: "Syria First." Or do we live up to our history of
Arab nationalism, and the legend we created for ourselves, and
gamble with Syria's future by sending its army to war in
Palestine? Some argued in 1948 that they did not want history to
say that Israel was created without the Arabs putting up a fight
against it, regardless if they win the war or not. But in fact,
history today does not mention the bravery of the Arabs for
going to war in 1948, all it mentions is their weakness. In
1948, President Shukri al-Quwatli knew that the Syrian Army was
weak, and bound to be defeated if it went to war in Palestine.
The Syrian Army had only recently been created (in 1946) after
the French Mandate ended in Syria; its soldiers were
ill-equipped, and its officers were inexperienced and unable to
engage in proper combat. Yet, Quwatli could not possible admit
that to the Syrians. It was Quwatli after all, and his
generation of politicians, who had indoctrinated the Syrian
people with myths about their superiority since the final days
of the Ottoman Empire. It was Quwatli, one of the finest and
greatest patriots of modern Arab history, who had spoken of Arab
nationalism, and particularly Palestine, pledging his support
for Syria's "Arab brothers." The Syrians were a great people, he
would say, with a great and strong army, and their history
proved that they could defy and defeat any threat being made
against Syria. How could he now, in 1948, tell the Syrian people
that they were weak and alone in the international community,
and that Syria's weight in the world order was minimal. How
could he tell them that it was the British, and not the people
of Syria, who had actually liberated Syria from the Ottomans in
1918 and the French in 1946. Rather than tell them the truth,
Quwatli decided to continue in the myth of political greatness
he had fed his people (with good intention) since coming to
power in 1943. He went to war in Palestine and the Syrian Army
was defeated because Quwatli did not have the ability to stand
up for "Syria First" in 1948.
In 2005, President Bashar al-Asad
stands where Shukri al-Quwatli had been 58-years ago. Today,
realizing that the USA is serious in its threats, he needs to
avoid the fate of Quwatli. When he came to power in 2000, Asad
marketed himself as a fervent Arab nationalist, with great
commitment to the Palestinian Cause. He had to fill in the shoes
of his father, who during his 30-year rule as president of
Syria, had shown great commitment to the liberation of
Palestine. President Bashar used every public occasion to
support the uprising in Palestine that broke out two months
after he came to power, in September 2000. It became the
cornerstone for political discourse, and the yardstick for
nationalism in his new Syria. His most notable speeches,
eulogizing the uprising in Palestine, were given during the Arab
Summits. Government officials praised the Palestinian
resistance, who had political offices in Syria from the days of
President Hafez, poets wrote eulogy, state-run TV, radio, and
newspapers hailed the uprising as one of the greatest events in
modern Arab history. Donations for Palestine were raised
throughout Syria, and Khalid Meshaal, leader of the political
bureau of Hamas, appeared often among Syrian masses during
demonstrations in Damascus, pledging that the uprising will
continue. How can Asad today ask the Palestinian resistance
based in Damascus to leave? He has repeatedly stressed that
Hamas and Islamic Jihad only have media offices in Syria. Can he
tell the world today that he had to ask them to leave because it
is in Syria's national interest that they set up base elsewhere?
Conventional wisdom says: yes, because "Syria First" is more
important today, to the average Syrian, than the intifada in
Palestine. Asad has already made his decision, despite the
latest lobbying of Israel, accusing Syria of standing behind the
Islamic Jihad bombing in Tel Aviv last week, that led to the
killing of 5 Israelis. Offices of the resistance no longer exist
in Syria. All of their top leaders, including Khalid Meshaal of
Hamas, have been politely asked to leave, to prevent Syria from
US pressure, or an Israeli air strike like the one made in
October 2003 at the Ayn al-Saheb Camp near Damascus, which
Israel claimed was a training camp for Islamic Jihad. Syria has
supported the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit in February 2005, which
effectively ends the Syrian-embraced intifada. In 2003, when
Mahmud Abbas was prime minister under Yasser Arafat, he attended
a summit at Sharm al-Sheikh with George Bush to negotiate the
Road Map, which also, if implemented, would have actually the
intifada. The first Sharm al-Sheikh Conference was greatly
criticized by Syria, and so was Mahmud Abbas for his cozying
with the USA. Syria today is helping Mahmud Abbas negotiate a
cease-fire with Hamas through Hizbullah. Abbas acknowledged
Syria's cooperation and new attitude on BBC, after the Tel Aviv
bombing of February 25, saying that, "There is neither any
evidence nor any proof that Syria was involved in the attack.
For this reason we can not speculate on the issue because of a
lack of evidence."
When the war on Iraq began in 2003,
Syria lobbied extensively against the US invasion. It did this
through its diplomats at the United Nations, in world capitals,
and on the streets in Syria through the massive demonstrations
that took place against the USA. When the war broke out, many
Syrians, indoctrinated with hatred for the USA due its invasion
of Iraq, crossed the border into Iraq and took up arms against
the Americans. This was done without approval of the Syrian
government. It was a populist movement motivated by a
combination Arab nationalism, Islamic nationalism, despair, and
hatred for Israel and the USA. The people wanted to fight and
unleash their anger. If they were prevented from going, the
state reasoned, these angry mobs would have certainly unleashed
their anger inside Syria, at other Syrians and at the
government. Some of Saddam Hussein's officials came to Syria
when the war ended in April 2003, and since then, the USA has
demanded their extradition but Syria has denied that they were
on its territory. Many senior officials were turned away at the
Syrian-Iraqi border and were latter arrested like rabbits in
different parts of Iraq. Since then, the USA has accused Syria
of all sorts of different crimes, ranging from welcoming
Saddam's closest aides to Syria, to funding the uprising of Abu
Musaab al-Zarkawi, to sending arms and volunteers to fight in
Iraq. Ostensible evidence has been brought up against Syria: men
appearing on Iraqi TV and admitting that they had been trained
by Syrian intelligence, a claim by Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem
al-Shaalan that an Iraqi woman, trained in Syria, had tried to
assassinate him, and a statement from Prime Minister Iyad Allawi
saying that he possessed photographs of guerilla fighters of the
Sunni insurgency in Iraq with a high-ranking Syrian official,
reported by media sources on the Internet to be Vice-President
Abd al-Halim Khaddam. This is hard to believe because Syria
would certainly not benefit from any insurgency on its borders
that threatens to spill its chaos into the Syrian Republic. It
was the chaos in Iraq in April 2004 that led a group of armed
Syrian men to return to Syria and carry out an act of sheer
terrorism in Damascus, attacking and destroying a UN building.
As for the photographs, it is difficult to believe that any
Syrian official, not least the seasoned Khaddam, would have his
picture taken as souvenir with masked men in khaki outfits
carrying weapons and heading off to Iraq. Some argue that all of
this meddling is taking place without approval, or knowledge, of
President Asad. It is being done, they claim, by one of his many
senior intelligence officers. This is even more difficult to
believe since today, there are no security barons in Syria who
have autonomy, or a large following, to carry out operations on
their own. With regard to Iraq, Asad has already began to pursue
the "Syria First" strategy. First, he endorsed the Iraqi
elections in January 2005, letting the Iraqis living in Syria
vote for the US-backed post-Saddam order. He welcomed Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi in Syria with full-honors, although many in
Syria consider the Allawi regime illegal because it was imposed
by the USA. It has created a wall on its 606 km border with
Iraq, to prevent people from illegally crossing, and created
observation units to monitor everyone and everything roaming
around the border. In early 2005, more than 15 clerics were
arrested for calling on their followers to fight the Americans,
as part of their religious duties (jihad). More recently, Syria
has applied strict security on its border to prevent the
crossing of insurgents through the Syrian border, and handed
Sabaawi Ibrahim, a senior advisor and half-brother to Saddam, to
Iraq, where he will stand trial as a war criminal like all other
ex-officials of the Baathist era. Sabaawi was # 36 on the US
list of 55 most wanted officials from Saddam's regime. Syria's
new attitude and cooperation were confirmed by none other than
the usually aggressive Defense Minister Hazem al-Shaalan, who
said on al-Arabiyya TV: "recently a form of cooperation has
begun and, truth be told, Sabaawi was seized through cooperation
with the Syrian side."
With regard to Lebanon, Syria has
also began to apply the "Syria First" strategy. Over the past
few months, international pressure has increased on Syria to
withdraw its troops from Lebanon. France, the USA, and the UN
have all pitched in with Resolution 1559, demanding that the
Syrian Army leave Lebanon, and the disarming of the
Syrian-backed Hizbullah. Pressure was increased on Damascus
after the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafiq al-Harriri
in February 2005, and many, including Great Britain, the USA,
and the Lebanese opposition, blamed Syria (either directly or
indirectly) for Harriri's murder, claiming that as the protector
of Lebanon, it had failed to protect Harriri. Syria showed
resistance to comply with withdrawal, knowing that its regional
reputation would be tarnished if it pulled out of Lebanon under
US pressure and to the chants of "Syria Out" by the Lebanese
opposition. Asad apparently realized the gravity of the
situation and began withdrawing his troops from Lebanon,
regardless of the bad image, in accordance with the
internationally recognized Taif Accord, co-authored by Syria in
1989. Total withdrawal, Asad said to TIME Magazine, would be in
a matter of months. It would probably be under auspices of the
Arab League. Syria would receive some form of guarantee, or
promise, from the USA that it will not impose sanctions on
Syria, that it will lift the Syrian Accountability Act, upstart
the Syrian-Israeli peace process. On February 28, 2005 the
pro-Syrian yet greatly unpopular cabinet of Prime Minister Omar
Karameh was dissolved by Karameh himself, greatly defusing the
anti-Syrian sentiment that was brewing in Lebanon. Syria did not
comment on the matter, saying that it was an "internal Lebanese
issue." What Syria needs to do today is secure the resignation
of the unpopular and Syrian-imposed President Emile Lahhoud,
because that is what the entire world wants, and totally absent
itself from the upcoming parliamentary election of Lebanon in
May 2005. In the meantime, its allies in Lebanon should be
completely abandoned and left to deal with their constituencies
in the upcoming elections. If they are popular among their
people, like Hizbullah, they will survive in post-Syria Lebanon.
Anti-Syrian figures like General Michel Aoun should be permitted
to return to Lebanon, and the arrested warlord Samir Gagegea
should be released (he was arrested during the Harriri era in
1994). All of this would restore confidence of the Lebanese, the
UN, France, and all of Europe, in Syria and President Asad. It
would gain more time for Syria, and make it easier to engage in
dialogue with the USA.