The
Making of a Figurehead: History Lessons from Tokyo and Ramallah
As
the world focuses its attention on Iraq and the future of President
Saddam Husayn, the future of another Arab leader is at stake. Yasser
Arafat, for the first time in 40-years, is facing a real danger of
becoming irrelevant. Much has been said in the past three years
about the sidelining of Arafat, by young military leaders like
Jibril al-Rajjoub, by civilian leaders of the Intifadah like
Marwan al-Barghouti, by hard-line nationalists from Hamas, and by
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Now more than ever, however,
Abu Ammar is facing danger of being sidelined by a constitutional
framework, embodied in the office of prime minister, which he
finally agreed to adopt in March 2003. The new post, which he has
long refused, would counter-balance the authority of the presidency
in the fragile Palestinian Authority (PA). It would create room for
someone to question Arafat on public spending, economic legislation,
peace talks, and internal affairs. It could, if steered correctly,
transform the PA into a state ruled by a prime minister with
full-powers, and a president with ceremonial ones. For someone with
Arafat’s caliber, character, and towering influence, this would be
very difficult to accept. Yet it would be more difficult to say no
and step down from office. And if the new prime minister tries to
flex his muscle, then surely, Arafat will try to break him. This
morning, on March 16, 2003, Abu Ammar appeared on the new Saudi
channel al-Arabiyya, saying that he has long wanted to
appoint a prime minister, but Israel has long vetoed the decision.
Everyone involved in Palestinian politics knows that this is untrue.
The office of premier is the beginning of the end for Arafat and
best US-way to contain him, in anticipation of writing him off
completely. Containing Arafat, in preparation of his political end,
will be very difficult to achieve since the new premier would have
to be, an exceptional man with exceptional talents in order to
sideline an exceptional leader like Yasser Arafat. This candidate is
Mahmud Abbas, better known by the nom de guerre of Abu Mazen.
The
Palestinian statesman (68) is one of the most prominent, capable,
and internationally popular figures of the PLO. Due to his moderate
policies, however, he enjoys little popularity at home, and for some
time, has been trying to change that. A former resident of Syria and
a graduate of law at Damascus University, he joined the PLO in 1965,
and was a co-founder of Arafat’s Fateh movement following the
Arab-Israeli War of 1967. He has been in the limelight of world
affairs as a civilian leader of the Palestinian resistance since
then. In 1993, his signature graced the ill-fated Oslo Peace
Agreement, and he has been promoted within political circles as the
second-in-command in the PA. Of course, the veteran Abu Mazen is a
big name today because the real big names of the PLO were all killed
by Israel or warring factions of the resistance over the past 30
years. Ali Hasan Salama, a “legendary” member of the Revolutionary
Command Council who was head of Arafat’s security, was slain in
Beirut in 1979, Zuhayr Muhsen, commander of al-Saiqa, was
killed in Cannes in 1979, Khalil al-Wazzir (Abu Jihad), was killed
by Ehud Barak in Tunis in 1988, and Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), the
director of PLO Intelligence, was killed in Tunis in 1991. Had these
men still been around, then Abu Mazen would have faced a slim, if
not impossible chance, of becoming Prime Minister. A pragmatic and
intelligent man, he nevertheless lacks the charisma of someone like
Salama, the talent of someone like Abu Iyad, and the character of
someone like Abu Iyad.
Therefore, his appointment, comes with many challenges and many
strings attached. First, Arafat cannot, for many reasons, continue
to lead the Palestinians in a one-man-show. Given his advanced age
and ailing conditions, he needs someone to deputize on his behalf
when he is unavailable, or if he dies while in office. Second,
Arafat is in need to appoint a prime minister to satisfy the
on-going demands for reform, made by his own people, the Arabs, and
the USA. He will give into pressure, but this doesn’t necessarily
mean that he will cooperate with his premier, or give him room to
maneuver. Sources close to the PLO speculate that Arafat will try to
give Abu Mazen ceremonial duties and keep him away from funds,
senior appointments, and peace talks. Security issues, political
issues, and pan-Arab affairs will also remain off-limits to the new
Prime Minister. In short, Abu Ammar sees a prime minister as solely
in-charge of economic affairs (something which he does not know how
to handle himself). By marginalizing the prime minister and keeping
him only in-charge of economic affairs, Arafat would make sure that
Abu Mazen will not succeed on his own and steal the spotlight.
Economic prosperity will only be achieved when occupation ends and a
political resolution is reached with Israel. And this can only be
done by Arafat. If he fails to achieve a political break-through,
than Abu Mazen will also fail to achieve an economic one as well.
They can sink together, but Arafat cannot bear to see Abu Mazen
floating alone.
To
succeed, Abu Mazen must first earn the trust and respect of the
Palestinian people. A declared dove who is not too-enthusiastic
about armed violence, his policies put him at odds with a people who
have suffered a lot and are not willing to put down their arms that
easily. His appointment faces an automatic opposition from militant
groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the large sections of Arafat’s
Fateh (which he no longer controls). The Israeli daily Maariv
published an editorial saying that Abu Mazen’s nomination could have
far reaching strategic implications, “because he is a man with a
backbone, a leader who doesn’t hesitate to come out against the
Intifadah and against terror, which in his view is getting the
Palestinians nowhere.” Although his moderate reputation is favorable
to Israel, they Israelis have been careful, however, not to
enthusiastically support him, fearing that this would destroy his
credibility among Palestinians and force him to take
ultra-nationalist policies against them. In August 2001, despite his
reputation, his picture appeared on the front-page of Maariv
as one of the seven Palestinian leaders Ariel Sharon wanted to
assassinate. Behind closed doors, however, the Israelis are pleased
that Abu Mazen is coming to power, and that finally, they can
negotiate with someone different from Yasser Arafat. In January
2002, it was rumored in the Israeli press that Abu Mazen met with
Sharon (in secret) in the Negev Desert to discuss a cease-fire.
Sharon reportedly told his aids that he would talk with anyone about
peace, except for Arafat (who for two years now, he has failed to
arrest, depose, or assassinate). Of course, Abu Mazen has denied
that such a meeting ever took place.
The
Arafat ordeal, in face of Abu Mazen’s appointment as Prime Minister,
reminded me greatly of the sidelining of Emperor Hirohito of Japan,
following the end of World War II, in 1945. From the beginning of
his reign in 1921 until 1945, Hirohito was literary regarded as an
un-smiling, no-compromise God—with unmatched popularity and
reverence in Japan. When the Allies defeated him in World War II,
Hirohito was kept at his post as a “symbol” of Japan, with no real
political power. The American scheme, orchestrated by General
Douglas MacArthur, was to invest in his personality and presence,
transforming him from an effective leader into a unifying force for
his countrymen. After all, three million Japanese had died for a war
launched in his name, and deposing him would have created a
permanent psychological disorder among his countrymen, who could not
imagine, or submit to a government, without him. Hirohito gave a
famed speech, denouncing “the false conception that the Emperor is
divine” and renouncing the same violence he had encouraged only a
few years earlier. He was transformed into a nice, smiling,
grand-fatherly like symbol for the people of Japan, with no power
whatsoever, over state affairs until his passing in 1989. When he
died, he had created an endurance on the world scene unmatched by
any leader in history. The case of Arafat is identical today. Before
Oslo, he was portrayed as an un-smiling, no-compromise, and supreme
leader of Palestine. He was the Che Guevara of the Arab World. With
revolver strapped by his side, Arafat was the perfect symbol of
resistance and honor to the Palestinians. He was the head of an
aggressive resistance movement that did not take no for an answer.
After the Intifadah, Arafat became similar to Hirohito after
the Allied victory in WWII. Stripped of his powers by circumstances,
and no longer able to dictate his will on a society drenched in
misery, poverty, and war, he faced two options: agreeing to US
demands of reforms and staying in power, or leaving the scene
altogether. Hirohito accepted a made-in-America constitution and
Arafat accepted a made-in-America reform plan (which included
creating the office of prime minister). In Japan, the post of prime
minister was created at the close of the war (similar to today) and
is currently the highest political authority in Tokyo. In 1946,
there was General MacArthur to remodel Japan, and today, there is
President Bush to try to remodel Palestine. Despite the official
rhetoric of the White House, it can be assumed that Bush wants to
invest in Arafat’s towering personality and presence, transforming
him from an effective leader into a unifying force for his
countrymen. Like Hirohito, however, Arafat will keep his title as
“symbol” of the state but will be forced to discard the divine image
he has adopted, in favor of a peaceful, smiling, grand-fatherly one.
Like Hirohito, he has denounced the same violence that he had
instigated a few years earlier. If he is sidelined today, he would
have created an endurance unmatched by most leader in the world.
Like Hirohito, Arafat (who has been called the “great survivor” or
the Houdini of the Middle East), has led his people from disaster to
disaster, but somehow, his people still love him. This is the
challenge facing Abu Mazen in trying to measure up or sideline a
leader with historic momentum like Yasser Arafat. And no one
understands the challenge better than Abu Mazen himself.