From Father to Son in Beiruti Politics
Tammam Salam is a
familiar name to everyone in Beirut. The residents of the Lebanese
capital, both young and old, have experienced the leadership of a
member of the Salam family, who for three generations, have
spearheaded the politics of Beirut. During the 20th
century, none of the traditional Salam leaders left Beirut despite
persecution by the Ottoman, French, and Israeli forces that occupied
the capital at different intervals. Abu Ali Salam fought against the
Turks in the early years of the century, his son Sa’eb Salam fought
off the French during the Mandate years and was one of the leaders
of Lebanese independence in 1943. While serving as cabinet minister
he was imprisoned by the French in 1943 and released to achieve a
paramount standing in the capital, commencing on a parliamentary
career that lasted for four decades during which he became a
six-time Prime Minister. In 1958, he fought off the pro-American
regime of President Kamil Sham’un and in 1975 spearheaded the Sunni
Muslim community during the Lebanese Civil War. When leadership
passed to his son Tammam in 1985, following Sa’eb Salam’s
self-imposed exile to Geneva, the young Salam went on to confront
the Israelis and the Christian militias of Bashir Gemayel that were
collaborating with them to bring an end to the Palestinian hegemony
in Lebanon. When the war ended in 1990, Salam emerged as one of the
most prominent leaders of Beirut in the post-war era. He was by his
father’s side when the latter helped broker the 1982 agreement
between US envoy Philip Habib and PLO leader Yasser Arafat, and in
1990, when Prime Minister Salam co-orchestrated the Taif Accord that
ended the Civil War. He boycotted the parliamentary elections in
1992 but became a deputy in 1996, among increased rumors that he
might be next-in-line to become Prime Minister. In 1992, he adopted
the position of his father, former Prime Minister Sa'eb Salam. The
latter, announcing his stand from his residence in Geneva, opposed
holding an election in an atmosphere of sectarian polarization,
which ran counter to the principle of communal coexistence. He
clashed with the regime of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Harriri
(1992-1998) and that of Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss (1998-2000),
and remained an independent in the war between the two men that took
place in 1998-2000. In the parliamentary elections of 2000, he
refused to side with either party and suffered a defeat at the
polls. Since then, he has devoted his time to the day-to-day affairs
of Beirut and watched, with a hidden degree of satisfaction, how the
people of Beirut are lamenting their current leaderships and longing
for what was described as, “the traditional leaderships” of the
Beiruti notability.
In his residence
in the Sunni neighborhood of what was once known as West Beirut, Tammam Salam rests on the laurels of his father Sa’eb. This mansion
was a stronghold for Sunni leaderships for the better part of the 20th
century, and from one generation to the next, has passed the
leadership of Beirut. Tammam Bey, as customarily called in Lebanon,
sits back and talks about Beiruti politics. He recalls that in 1992,
when Rafiq al-Harriri presented himself as a serious candidate for
the premiership in Lebanon, “he was still not accepted by the
citizens of Beirut.” Harriri was an outsider, who although
originally from Sidon, had lived the better part of his life in
Saudi Arabia and was a political nobody. In an array of familiar
faces who had lived in Beirut, with the people, during the war
years, Harriri was a stranger. He had a difficult time to live up to
the image of Muslim leaders like Sa’eb Salam, Salim al-Hoss, and
Omar Karameh. To compensate for his shortcomings, Harriri came with
a promising agenda for economic reform and unconditional backing
from Syria, the de facto decision-maker in Lebanon, and Saudi
Arabia. Salam recalls, “I could not work with Harriri back then
because he had reservations towards me. At the time, I was not on
favorable terms with Damascus because I had boycotted the 1992
elections and the Syrians considered this a hostile attitude.” In
1996, he did not join Harriri’s parliamentary list, nor did he take
part in that of Salim al-Hoss but managed to penetrate both and
emerge victorious. Once a deputy for Beirut, he reconciled with
everyone until the presidential elections of 1998. Here, Salam
supported the election of Emille Lahhoud, who was serving as Chief
of Staff and had hard-line backing from Syrian President Hafez al-Asad.
His decision to support Lahhoud’s candidature was seen at the time
as an attempt at reconciling with Damascus. “I was with the new
President,” he adds, “and so was everyone else, including Harriri.”
Salam came to
blows with the Lebanese Government once again, however, shortly
after Harriri’s downfall in 1998 and the ascent of Prime Minister
Salim al-Hoss. He was highly critical of the Hoss cabinet, accusing
it of having “weak figures” who were not fit to solve Lebanon’s
numerous political and economic grievances. He was also critical of
Hoss using the courts to bring Harriri loyalists to justice.
“Despite the negative performance of the government in its first six
months in office,” he says, “the President did not want a government
change. He believed that this would be a slump in his image and in
his confrontation with the opposition who were demanding a cabinet
reshuffle. It was not like that. A government change was needed to
save Lebanon from accumulating wrongs.” He adds, “I faced a dilemma,
because I was neither with the government nor with the opposition.
When the confrontation between both increased, the moderate stance
that I took weakened and the margin of conduct became very slim.” He
adds that when the elections of 2000 arrived, “an alliance with
Harriri was possible in order to obtain a parliamentary seat, but I
did not want to run in the shadow of others.” He went to Damascus to
meet with Syria’s then-new President Bashar al-Asad and was visited
by General Ghazi Kenan, the Syrian officer in-charge of Lebanese
affairs who was signaling the readiness of Damascus to forget
hostility of 1992 and back Salam’s nomination.
On his relations
with Syria, Tammam Salam said, “I am neither with those who
exaggerate in their alliance with Syria and not with those who have
blind reservations towards Damascus.” He adds, “I was not pleased
with the Maronite Patriarch Mar Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir’s
declaration against Syria in September 2000. It was painful and
created an un-stable situation in Lebanon.” This increasing
anti-Syrian movement led to the August 2001 crackdown on Christian
dissidents in Beirut and the street fights that ensued between
stalwarts of the opposition and the military police. Back then,
Salam voiced his opposition to the “militirazation of politics” but
said that, “it isn’t easy in this turbulent regional situation to
alienate or weaken the military branch and replace it with a
civilian one.” However, “although certain conditions cannot be
handled democratically and need the military to interfere (such as
when the opposition sided with Israel in 2001 to oust Syria from
Lebanon), we do not accept that the officers interfere in day-to-day
politics.” The crackdown of August 2001, Salam concludes, was a
combination of several different factors. First, it was an attempt
by the pro-Syrian regime to curb the influence of the Christian
opposition, which had increased in power following the death of
Hafez al-Asad in June 2000. Second, it was an attempt at hampering
Israel’s intention to interfere in Lebanese domestics, via its
former director of Lebanese affairs Uri Lubrani, who met the
Christian stalwarts and coordinated anti-Syrian activity with them
in Cyprus. Third, it was an attempt by the military apparatus that
is controlled by Lahhoud, to curb the rising influence of Prime
Minister Harriri, who was not informed of the arrests beforehand. By
taking military action without referring to him, Lahhoud was showing
Harriri, whose relation with had been characterized by friction,
that military and political affairs are controlled by the President.
Finally, Salam
responds to a media statement made in 2000, when he lost the
parliamentary elections, claiming that this was the beginning of the
end of the urban notability of Beirut, who had been in control of
politics since Ottoman times. “We cannot judge things permanently by
passing events” he explains, and adds that the elections were, “a
passing event.” He adds, “I had no objection to the decision of the
people of Beirut, who were desperate and did not know who they voted
for in the elections. Likewise, they did not know who they did not
vote for. They did not know that they did not vote for Tammam Salam.
With the exception of Harriri, who was a symbol of opposition, the
other parliamentary nominees were new, unfamiliar faces.” The
Beirutis now have “reconsidered” their choice and are blaming
themselves for their drive in 2000. “My grandfather Abu Ali Salam
was forced to leave Beirut for economic reasons and lived abroad for
many years. He was distant from politics in Beirut but does this
mean that his leadership ended? On the contrary, he returned
stronger than before!” He adds, “My father Sa’eb Salam clashed with
the regime of President Fou’ad Shihab in the 1960s and was kept away
from politics. An article appeared in al-Nahhar saying that
grass has began to emerge on the footsteps of Salam’s residence due
to the lack of visitors. Does this mean that Sa’eb Salam was
politically finished?” Salam then points out, “Beirut never was, and
never will be, a monopoly for anybody. If my father and grandfather
were leaders and managed to achieve a prominent status for the
family, this doesn’t mean that leadership is solely theirs. This was
never our objective. In 2000, it was not the first time that leaders
come from other cities to establish themselves in Beirut. In the
1940s, there was Riyad al-Sulh, who like Harriri came from Sidon, to
become a Beiruti leader. Beirut is not a village or a minor
city—Beirut is Beirut! It is the capital and represents all of
Lebanon.” Concluding, Salam says, “I for my part have remained with
the people of Beirut, and I hope that this is not the beginning of
the end of Beiruti leaderships!”