The Grand Ayatollah of Iraq, Ali al-Sistani
is probably one of the most influential, controversial, and
interesting figures in the new Middle East. At first glance he
greatly resembles Ayatollah al-Khomeini, leader of the Islamic
Revolution of Iran who terrorized the West during his 10-year
tenure in Tehran (1979-1989) becoming an icon for evil in
Hollywood. Both are elderly Shiites, and both are bearded,
wearing large turbans and black robes. This, however, is where
the similarities end. Yet to the average American, both are
mullahs, both are advocates of an Islamic State, and both
resemble Osama Bin Laden in faith and appearance. The average
American must wonder: is this what American soldiers fought and
died for in Iraq? An Islamic republic like Iran, run by another
Ayatollah? They are asking: did American mothers send their
children to the Gulf War in order to liberate men like these
from dictatorship? In the post 9-11 world, the image of Sistani
is not greatly welcomed by the West. Yet, nobody in the West,
especially the average American, knows who Ali al-Sistani really
is. Will this man attack the US embassy in Baghdad and take
hostages, as Khomeini’s followers did in Iran in November 1979?
Will he go to war with neighboring countries that oppose his
pro-American program, like Syria? Or will he live up to his
reputation of being a wise, patriotic, and moderate leader for
post-Saddam Iraq? While most of the Western media, influenced by
the USA, picture him as one of the most cooperative and
patriotic leaders in modern Iraq, his Sunni opponents criticize
him in secret, accusing him of unjustifiable cooperation with
the Americans. This article tries to paint a balanced picture of
the Ayatollah.
Differences with Khomeini
Ali al-Sistani was born in Mashhad
(Iran) in 1929 to a family of religious scholars. He studied at
the hands of the Grand Ayatollah Abdul-Qasim Khoei. Sistani rose
in religious rank to be named a marjé (religious reference) in
1960 during the heyday of the secular military dictatorship of
President Abd al-Karim Qasim. He embraced religion when Arab,
rather than Islamic nationalism, was the popular ideology in
Iraq, and where the number of theology students was dropping by
the thousands. In 1918, for example, 6,000 students studied at
the theology schools of Sistani’s native Najaf, while by 1957 it
had dropped to 1954, of whom only 326 were Iraqis. Many of those
enrolled, according to the historian Hanna Batatu, did so only
in name in order to secure exemption from otherwise compulsory
service in the Iraqi Army. Sistani supported separation of
religion from the state, under the influence of Khoei, and this
spared him persecution by the military dictators of the 1960s
and 1970s. In theory, he had no problem with the officers
keeping the clergy away from political life in Iraq. Sistani
stayed away from politics, leading a monastic life, and
attracted millions of supporters throughout Iraq, Iran, Lebanon,
Syria, and Pakistan. In theory, he supported the Iranian Islamic
Revolution of 1979, but grew disenchanted by Khomeini’s
theocracy. Sistani believed that government should be run by
politicians, not clergymen, whose duty would be to maintain law
and order, run economic affairs, day-to-day politics and foreign
relations. The clergy should not become politicians, he
stressed, because this would corrupt them and distort their
religious message. Instead, they should limit themselves to
spiritual and religious matters in which the politicians cannot
pass sound judgment. Khomeinism, on the other hand, gave
complete political control and responsibility, to the clergymen.
Khomeini advocated a system called vilayet-e-faqih (guardianship
of the jurisprudent); clerical rule in political affairs while
Sistani called for it only in social issues. Khomeini
established a cult personality for himself in Iran, much to the
horror of the USA, whom he famously labeled as “The Great
Satan.” Sistani opposed that an ayatollah like Khomeini would
involve himself in such a war of words—something that should be
handled by the politicians, not the clergy. Even today, with US
forces in Iraq, Sistani has refrained from ever criticizing the
USA, urging his men not to take up arms against the Americans,
yet refusing to meet with any US official on Iraqi soil. He
acknowledges that they are invaders, but it is not his duty to
fight them out of Baghdad. He welcomed the war on Saddam
Hussein, with no mandate from the UN, yet insisted on having UN
inspectors at the elections.
While Khomeini’s team, and not
necessarily Khomeini himself, were influenced by the methods of
Arab dictators, such as immortalizing the leader and one-party
rule, Sistani was a democrat at heart, who believed in the
people’s right to choose. This explains why he embraced the
January 2005 elections in Iraq, calling on the Shiites, that
make up 60% of Iraq’s 27 million, to vote, claiming that this
was a religious duty. Sistani knows that when the Shiites
boycotted the elections of 1922, objecting to Sunni hegemony,
they were totally left out from political decision-making, not
only under monarchial Iraq, but for the rest of the 20th
century. In 1933, the Sunni monarch King Faysal I wrote: “The
Shiite ulamaa have no connection with the government and are at
present estranged from it, particularly in as much as they see
the Sunni ulamaa in possession of funds and properties of which
they are deprived, and envy, notably among the religious
classes, is something well-known.” That is precisely why Sistani
has insisted that every Iraqi Shiite must vote—even a woman
whose husband forbids her from voting can defy his orders and go
to the ballots! The Shiites in 1922 had objected to holding
elections under occupation (just like the Sunnis are doing
today), and suffered tremendously for their stance. What did
they get? A British-written Constitution, something that would
have likely been repeated by the Americans had the Shiites
refrained from voting in 2005. Sistani sees it as his duty to
never let the Shiites commit such a blunder again.
Becoming a Leade
Sistani’s mentor, Imam Khoei, died
in 1992 and named him successor. Saddam Hussein dreaded
Sistani’s influence, especially since the Shiite cleric had
endorsed a US-backed Shiite rebellion against him in 1991. As
much as he wished, Saddam could not murder Ali al-Sistani
because this would have created civil war in Iraq. Having just
been ejected from Kuwait, defeated at the hands of the US Army,
faced a rebellion in southern Iraq, and brought under UN
sanctions, Saddam could not jeopardize his regime by going to
war with the Shiites. Nor could Saddam make Sistani vanish, as
Libyan leader Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi had done with the Lebanese
Shiite leader Musa al-Sadr in 1978. Years later, when having
re-enforced his power in 1999, Saddam murdered Mohammad Sadeq
al-Sadr, another famous cleric, without blinking, but in 1991,
he had too much on his hands and could not do the same with
Sistani. Instead, he put Sistani under house arrest, shut down
his mosque, and forbad him from preaching. The Shiite leader
remained in seclusion until Saddam was toppled in 2003. He has
since re-enforced his authority over Shiites throughout the
region, sending emissaries to Iran to meet with the clergy, and
relying on state-of-the-art technology to market his leadership
through the world wide web. This is mainly done through a
multi-language website called www.sistani.org, which attracts
three million visitors from Iran alone every month. Sistani
receives hundreds of visitors at his home in Najaf every day,
but does not go out, does not give interviews, nor does he like
his photograph taken. His office is Internet-wired and his aids
are often on Google, surfing the net to brief him on latest
updates taking place around the world.
Challenges
Despite his popularity, Sistani does
face several challenges in Iraq. First, many Shiites in Iraq do
not want to cooperate with the Americans, remembering only too
well how the USA triggered them to rise against Saddam in 1991,
then let the Iraqi dictator butcher them without lifting a
finger to stop him. The Ghandian methods of Sistani have aroused
the anger of young radical and militant leaders of the Shiite
community, like Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of a militia called the
Mehdi’s Army, who is 42-years Sistani’s junior. Although he does
not match him in religious legitimacy, Sadr is popular among the
youth, and has a particular power-base among the urban poor,
whereas Sistani’s influence is paramount among the urban middle
and higher class of the Shiite community. Some have interpreted
Sistani’s increased involvement in political affairs since 2003
as a direct response to the popularity of Sadr, fearing that he
would outflank him. This is far-fetched and very difficult to
believe since Sistani is a confident man who intensified his
political dealings only because he was the highest religious
authority for the Shiites in Iraq and felt responsible for them,
and Iraq as a whole, due to the turmoil that took place after
the fall of Saddam and the terrible economic conditions of all
Iraqis. In April 2004, Sadr went to war against the Americans in
Najaf, inspiring thousands of militant Shiites. Sistani ordered
a cease-fire, which went into effect in May, but in August, he
was rushed to London for medical reasons, and before reaching
Heathrow Airport, fighting had broken out again in Najaf. Some
speculated that he left Iraq on purpose, to give the Americans
an easy assault on Sadr. By physically absenting himself from
Najaf, he was distancing himself completely from Muqtada al-Sadr.
The fact that he could have been treated in Iraq, in nearby
Iran, or Lebanon, since all he needed was minor surgery, also
colored him as too pro-West in the eyes of some conservatives.
On August 15, 2004, the Sunday Times quoted US commander Major
David Holahan on Sistani’s departure: “A lot of people think it
is the green light for us to do what we have to do!” Sistani
remained abroad for three weeks, returning to Iraq while
fighting was still raging on in Najaf. Using his towering
influence, he once again brokered a cease-fire between the USA
and Sar. According to Milan Rai in the article “The Sistani
Puzzle” many young Iraqi Shiites began to lose faith in
Sistani’s leadership as a result of his exodus during the Sadr’s
fighting with the USA. Some even began to tear down his photos,
claiming that he had escaped and not saved their city. One said,
'Sistani escaped from Najaf. There are more hospitals in Baghdad
to treat the same disease but he escaped to save himself.'
Another agreed: 'Sistani escaped from Iraq because he was
afraid. There are hospitals [in Iraq] that can treat him. At the
end he is a coward.' Both of the angry Shiites were in the
mid-20s. Yet Sistani re-intervened at the excellent moment, when
Sadr and his men were surrounded by US tanks, ready to be mowed
down. They had no choice but to obey him, and the Americans too,
had no choice but to let him handle the messed situation. The
Americans understood how unwise it would be to cross Sistani,
and being always in need of legitimate leaders to work with
them, they cannot afford losing someone with his towering
influence in the Shiite community. When US administrator Paul
Bremer tried to push for a constitution penned by US-appointed
officials, Sistani objected, claiming that the constitutional
assembly should be voted for directly by the people themselves.
Rather than hold by his views, Bremer immediately backed down.
Ali al-Sistani has a clear agenda: to achieve democracy,
safeguard the rights of the Shiites, and set up an
Islam-friendly regime in Baghdad, ruled by politicians yet
supervised in religious affairs, by the clergy. He sees himself
as Iraq’s guardian and not, as the political puppet master, as
some accuse him of wanting to become. He has read his history
correctly and remembers only too well how the Shiites had
suffered from one Sunni-dominated regime to the next, starting
off with the Ottoman Sultans in the 1500s to Saddam Hussein in
1979-2000. He also wants them to remain devoted to Shiite Islam,
in as much as they are devoted to Iraq, to remain united against
everyone, the Sunnis, the Americans, the Kurds, etc. Sistani has
the power today to make Iraq a democracy. It would be difficult,
but the keys to success are in his hands more so than in men
like Ahmad Chalabi or Iyad Allawi. The Americans must take him
very seriously. His cooperation in Iraq is what prevents them
from striking at the Shiite regime in Iran, despite its nuclear
program, or the Shiite militia of Hizbullah in Lebanon, despite
its continued war with Israel. Sistani would hear nothing of
both scenarios. If the Americans foolishly decide to side-step
him, he could unleash hell in the Fertile Crescent. He is the
best Ayatollah in Iraq and they have to accept that his vision
of democracy for post-Saddam Iraq is very different from what
they had in mind.