Abu Ammar or Chaos: A Study in Post-Arafat Palestine

The situation in Palestine has sent vibrant shock waves throughout the Arab World. In the Middle East, you can almost smell the blood in Palestine, and feel the turmoil and instability in the Palestinian Authority (PA). For the first time since the intifada broke out in 2000, we as Arabs are worried more so about inter-Palestinian strife, than Palestinian-Israeli violence. Of course, at the end of the day, all trouble in the Occupied Territories can be attributed, in one way or another, to Ariel Sharon, and if chaos prevails in Palestine, then it is due to Sharon's brutal measures since 2000, and his planned destruction of the PA, more so than Yasser Arafat's inability to properly rule Palestine. Since the Oslo Accords in 1993, we have been promised by everyone, Abu Ammar and the late Ahmad Yassin, that civil war among the Palestinians was a red line that nobody could cross. These promises, sadly, are evaporating into thin air today. The latest events prove the exact opposite: the assassination attempt at Nabil Amro, the ex-Minister of Information, carried out by Palestinians, the kidnapping of Ghazi al-Gibali, the Chief of Police in Gaza, the kidnapping of Sami Abu Salim, the mayor of Dayr al-Balah, the kidnapping of Fadl al-Shuli, the deputy mayor of Nablus, the kidnapping of four French citizens in Khan Yunis, the kidnapping of Khalid Abu al-Ula, an official in Arafat's PA, all topped by the resignation of Prime Minister Ahmad Qurai, along with PA Intelligence Commander Amin al-Hindi, and Commander of Preventative Security, Rashid Abu Shibak. Yesterday, on July 24, 2004, armed militants stormed and burned down police headquarters in al-Zuwayda village in Gaza, while armed men occupied the governorate of Khan Yunis. Enjoying all this confusion is Ariel Sharon and his press, which has been gloating for the past week with one unified headline, "Chaos in the Palestinian Territories!" The one person who has brilliantly risen out of the ashes, surprising all observers, is the ever-present Yasser Arafat. Abu Ammar emerged from the storm in Palestine, victorious as ever, raising a million questions and answers on how the crisis will be settled, and where Palestine is headed, both under his leadership, and once he is gone. If so much chaos can take place during his lifetime, it would be a nightmare to imagine the Occupied Territories once he is gone. If anything, the crisis shows one thing: how weak the Palestinians are, and how strong Yasser Arafat really is.

-The Dahlan Challenge

For some months now, Arafat has been accused of failing back on his duties as president; as being unable and unwilling to fight corruption, and bring order and stability to the Palestinian Territories because that would mean reforms, leading to a democratic Palestine from which he would be absent from power for being "expired." Once again, Arafat acted with wisdom and worked slowly to regain confidence of the Palestinian street, investing in the chaos being created by Israel. Arafat knew that in times of war, everyone will rally around his/her leader. He appointed officials in senior posts, like Ghazi al-Gibali and Musa Arafat, knowing perfectly well that they were vetoed by the people for their corruption, yet acceptable and welcomed by Israel and the USA. This scored him points with Washington and Tel Aviv, yet infuriated the mass public. When people rioted in protest, Arafat did not put down the disturbances (as customarily done in the past), but in fact encouraged them, then showed that he had "given into" public pressure by retiring the same men he had appointed earlier, and replacing them with officials more acceptable to the masses. At the end of the day, he projected the image of a sincere leader who obeyed what his people dictated, always abiding to Palestinian nationalism. He turned down the resignation of Ahmad Qurai, refusing to grant him any real powers, again angering his own people, then "gave-in" to pressure from the Palestinian street, the USA, and the EU, which threatened to re-calculate its alliance with Arafat if he abandoned the reformer Abu Alaa. By hanging on to Abu Alaa, then empowering him with more authority, Arafat not only appeared to be more humble by democratizing Palestine (at his own expense) but also, came across as a cooperative reformer willing to go to great lengths to appease the West and his subjects. Again, he reverted his earlier decision, accepting, in a dramatic move, to transfer some of his presidential powers to the prime minister, giving him real authority, and transferring the responsibilities of internal security (previously under Arafat's direct control), to the Ministry of Interior. This would achieve two aims: appease the street, and free him from the burden of maintaining law and order. If Abu Alaa's Ministry of Interior succeeds, Arafat will make sure that he appoints one of his yes-men as Minister of Interior, to receive credit for the victory. Palestinian sources have already confessed that a likely candidate for the post will be Tayyib Abdul Rahim, the secretary-general of the presidency, as opposed to General Nasr Yusuf or Mohammad al-Dahlan, two men famed for their opposition to Arafat. If the Ministry fails, Arafat can stand back and blame Abu Alaa for failure.

Arafat faces a tremendous challenge in bringing law and order to Palestine. For example, in Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Gaza City, entire neighborhoods are ruled by street gangs and his PA is totally absent. Mohammad Dahlan, a former protégé of the president and ex-minister of security affairs under Abu Mazen, is not making things any easier for the President. He is believed by many to have his eyes set on the presidency in post-Arafat Palestine. Dahlan is leading the secular opposition to Arafat (as opposed to the Islamic one of Hamas and Islamic Jihad), having established a wide power base for himself in Khan Yunis, dubbed "the independent republic of Dahlan." He is believed to be responsible for the resignation, en mass, of 400 members of Arafat's Fateh in February 2004, to protest the corruption in the PA, an act that greatly embarrassed the President. Then, Dahlan, leading an army of thugs, had his men assault General Ghazi al-Jibali, Arafat's police chief of Gaza, and kill one of his officers. In February 2004, Ibrahim Abu Naja, another Arafat loyalist, was beaten at his office in Dahlan’s native Khan Yunis. Recently, however, Arafat has tried to reconcile with Dahlan, under the urging of President Husni Mubarak. On February 19, 2004 he had lunch with Dahlan at his destroyed office in Ramallah, and six days later, Arafat made a gesture of goodwill towards Dahlan by convening and chairing Fateh’s Revolutionary Council, which has not met in 30 years, where he. acknowledged wide-scale corruption, saying that it must be combated immediately, effectively echoing what Dahlan has been saying since 2003. In July 2004, Dahlan made his own gesture towards Arafat, publicly pledging his loyalty to him in an interview with the London based daily al-Hayat.

-Alternatives to Yasser Arafat

Barry Rubin wrote an article in Middle East Quarterly quoting a Palestinian official as saying: "Egyptian politics is like the pyramid: President Husni Mubarak is at the top, and there is a very wide base. Syrian politics is like the Eiffel Tower: President Hafez al-Asad is at the top, and there are a few people on each level. Palestinian politics is the shape of Yasser Arafat. Yasser Arafat is Palestinian politics and that’s all there is to it!" This is very true for Arafat, and very alarming as well. Arafat cannot be described as a healthy man, and although his ill health has often been exaggerated by Israel and his Arab enemies, he is 74-years old, and will not live much longer. He has not appointed a successor, prevented anyone from becoming a self-appointed successor, and crippled the creation of institutions that could provide for a smooth transition of power. This is what prompts a new generation of Palestinians, headed by Mohammad Dahlan, to harbor presidential ambitions and resort to ugly and unethical ways to meet them. Dahlan has been accused of triggering the recent turmoil in Palestine, with the sole aim of destroying stability, shattering national security, and embarrassing Arafat. All those who could have rightfully and ethically succeeded Arafat (since they equaled him in popularity and legitimacy) have been destroyed in one way or another: Abu Jihad, Abu Iyad, and Abu Hasan Salameh, were all killed, Faysal al-Husayni died young, and Marwan al-Barghouti is in jail, serving a lifetime in an Israeli prison. All leaders left behind today, like Dahlan, have none of Arafat's creditentials, connections, and authority.

According to the Palestinian Constitution, once the president dies, the Chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) replaces him as acting president until elections are held. This is unlikely to happen, due to the weak commitment to constitutional procedures in the PA. A more likely scenario would be that the central committee of Fateh would choose a successor to Abu Ammar. The committee has 17-members (excluding Arafat), most of whom have been hand-picked by Arafat himself for their unwavering loyalty. Only three can be described as moderates: Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Ahmad Qurai (Abu Alaa), and Nasr Yusuf. Five of the 17-members are hard-liners like Arafat: Faruq al-Qaddumi (Abu al-Lutf), Abbas Zaki, Sakr Habash, Abu Maher, Salah al-Za'nun. The remaining 9 are puppets of the Palestinian President. This body, composed of veteran PLO members, would likely chose someone very similar to Arafat, or someone designated by Arafat himself before his passing. An election, or plebiscite, would take place, but this, like all Arab countries, would be only to confirm the decision already made by Fateh. Most probably, if these will be the decision-makers in post-Arafat Palestine, then the leader would have to be, one of them, or at least, someone with a caliber very different from that of Dahlan.

We've got the ever-present Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the self-appointed heir to Abu Ammar for many years who only fell out with Arafat after serving briefly as prime minister, under US auspices, in 2003. He comes across as a strong reformer, and has a strong background not only as a one-time friend of Arafat, but also as secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, and a former prime minister. He lacks any power base inside Palestine, has no money to distribute to his followers, and is much loathed by the mass public for having wanted to crack down on Hamas, and disarm the resistance to please the USA and Israel, when he was serving as Prime Minister in 2003. The other possibility would be Faruq al-Qaddumi, who enjoys real power and is a seasoned statesman in his own right, but who nevertheless lives outside the Occupied Territories, in Tunis. He is very loyal to Abu Ammar, and equally revolutionary and hard-boiled, making him very attractive to the mass public. The current Prime Minister Abu Alaa is also an candidate, since he has his supporters in the Occupied Territories, and is famed for being both a reformer and a professional technocrat. He too is 100% pro-Arafat (although they might seem to disagree), but is neither in good health, nor does he have a real power base to make a national hero out of him, similar to the status enjoyed by Qaddumi. Another favorable candidate, from outside the central committee of Fateh, would be Marwan al-Barghouti, the arrested intifada leader from the West Bank. He is attractive to the masses because he has championed the argument that the Palestinians should make peace only after they have defeated Israel. Barghouti represents a young guard of radical Palestinians, veterans of the first intifada, who are most likely to wrestle power from old guard reformists of the PLO like Abu Mazen, Abu Alaa, and radicals like Faruq al-Qaddumi, Ahmad Jibril, and George Habash, who although in political retirement, still commands authority among his loyalists and can still make and shake Palestinian politics. The final solution would be for Hamas to replace Yasser Arafat. Hamas is no longer the party it used to be during the early years of the intifada. It is weak (although Arab nationalists refuse to admit it), both militarily and politically, especially after the assassination of its founder Ahmad Yassin, and leader Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi. Since Yassin's murder in March 2004, Hamas has been unable to strike back, or even inflict minimal losses on Israel, although it promised to "open the gates of hell" on the Zionist State. Hamas would probably be unable to rise to the top, but can shift the balance of power towards any one faction it may decide to support in post-Arafat Palestine. Undoubtedly, many regional players will try to interfere in post-Arafat Palestine. Iran for example, would favor Islamist groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, while Syria would back leaders like Faruq al-Qaddumi and Marwan al-Barghouti, known for their radicalization vis-à-vis Israel. Egypt, on the other hand, would support moderates like Abu Mazen and Abu Alaa. The USA and Israel would support moderate militants like Mohammad Dahlan, who are eager for power, and courageous enough to make un-popular decisions, such as termination of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. All of these players would be eager to re-assert their influence in Palestinian politics, after Arafat forbid them from doing so, especially after taking matters into his own hands and signing Oslo in 1993.

None of the men mentioned above, neither the radicals like Abu al-Lutf and Barghouti, nor the moderates like Abu Mazen and Abu Alaa, not even the newcomers like Dahlan, have a real power base that stretches throughout the Palestinian territories. The only person to have that is Yasser Arafat. To create this power base, any post-Arafat leader needs to speak militantly, because moderation could prove political suicide. Nobody in the Palestinian street wants a moderate leader to grant concessions to Israel. Anyone who does that, except Yasser Arafat, will be considered a traitor. This is very clear in how Abu Mazen fell from grace with thunder in 2003, only because he had cuddled up to the USA and Israel. Whereas when Arafat laid down his guns in 1993, in a manner more dramatic than Abu Mazen, none of the Palestinians dared go so far as to coin him a "traitor." Simply put: due to his past record in revolution, Arafat has more room to maneuver with Israel than any other Palestinian. Nobody doubts his nationalism. Although Arafat has put on a peaceful face since Oslo, he remains single-handedly responsible for indoctrinating the masses with revolutionary rhetoric since 1965. Four generations have been raised, listening to Arafat's inflammatory speeches, and anything short of that will be unacceptable in post-Arafat Palestine. It was Arafat who since the 1960s insisted that every Israeli is an enemy, and every spot on earth is a battleground for the Palestinians. This is why despite his insistence that he is no longer leader of a revolution, the Israelis do not believe him. When he dies, Arafat the radical revolutionary will be remembered more so by his people and Israel than Arafat the peacemaker. It is now clear that unlike what many speculated in 2000, Arafat was partly responsible for launching the intifada. It was not simply, a mass movement fueled by Sharon's visit to the Aqsa Mosque. Since 1965, Arafat has been greatly influenced by the Algerian Revolution, where one million martyrs were sacrificed for statehood and were able to defeat a great military power like France. He has always argued that the Palestinians can do the same. So long as people are willing to die for Palestine, Arafat knows that his strategy would succeed, and his leadership would survive. The truth is that Arafat the peacemaker never replaced the revolutionary leader. We must understand that to judge Arafat fairly before history. More importantly, this must be understood by anyone who wants to rule in post-Arafat Palestine.

The upcoming leader would need to live up to Arafat's image as a revolutionary, and have enough legitimacy to impose his will on the PLO, the PA, and Fateh. After all, succeeding Arafat would have to be in more than one role since his jobs include: chairman of the PLO, chairman of its Executive Committee, President of the PA, head of Fateh, and chairman of Fateh Revolutionary Committee. The post-Arafat leader would also have to have some legitimacy in Western circles since Arafat symbolizes and personifies the Palestinian Cause to the West. Even now, at the apex of last week's crisis in the PA, Great Britain and Germany insisted that Arafat was a partner for peace, despite the American insistence not to deal with him. He is the Palestinians greatest asset in eliciting Western support for the Palestinian Cause. His successor would undergo a trial period before the international community, evoking less automatic sympathy and certainly less convincing. Another trait that Arafat's successor must have is overwhelming power—the ability to impose his will on everyone and everything in Palestine. Although he is seemingly weak today (although this is not true), the fact is that Arafat continues to control every aspect of Palestinian politics. "Loyal opposition" is a fabricated stunt in most Arab regimes, but in Palestine, it is a reality. All of the Palestinian factions, at the end of day, line up in rank-and-file behind Arafat since he is the greatest manifestation of the Palestinian struggle. When the Israelis raided his compound in Ramallah in March 2002, enemy and ally alike rallied behind him. When Israel decided to expel him in late 2003, thousands paraded in his favor, headed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Today, during the latest storm rocking the PA, both Hamas and Islamic Jihad have set aside their differences with the PA and pledged support for Arafat.

One might ask in conclusion: what has Arafat achieved now for the Palestinians? Hasn't he led them from one military defeat to the next? The Palestinians were defeated by Jordan in 1970, by Israel in 1982, by Syria in 1983, and again, by the Israelis today, as the intifada is shifting in Israel's favor. How is it that this man transferred every military defeat into victory? While some argue that Oslo was a total defeat, others claim that it did achieve many material gains for the Palestinians. Prime on the list is bringing them into the world order, as a recognized and respected people, making them part of the UN, giving them a say in international affairs, and bringing their plight to world attention. In many ways, Oslo did for the Palestinians what the Holocaust did for the Jews during World War II, bringing them out of the ghettos and rewarding their persecution for years with statehood. Oslo restored Palestine to the map of the world. Maybe it is not historic Palestine, but it is Palestine, nevertheless. Arafat was able to bring the entire Palestinian leadership, with its men, women, children, money, and know-how, from the Diaspora back home, to wage a battle from inside Palestine. This was done after all indicators confirmed that a war of liberation cannot be waged from the sick Arab environment that surrounds Palestine. Now, the Palestinians under Arafat had a parliament, a constitution, an independent judiciary, a social security program, a police force, schools, universities, a public sector, and all the small elements of statehood. This of course, was all destroyed by Ariel Sharon. Once inside, Arafat refused to disarm the domestic resistance, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as required by Oslo, and approved, if not took part in, their attacks against Israel. He created a police force, which was dubbing for the Palestinian Army, in proportions much larger than those permitted by Oslo, and reconstructed the PLO's old resistance apparatus of Tanzim, the military arm of Fateh. He acquired loads of weapons, prohibited by Oslo, and authorized a guerilla war from inside Palestine. Given the current setting in Palestine, some see the alternative to Arafat as being chaos, since nobody will be able to meet what he achieved, while others argue that it would be a collective leadership of weak men, not coming close to Arafat's authority, unable to make needed tough decisions. This collective leadership would be synonymous with near-anarchy for the Palestinians, lacking any centralized authority. Sending Arafat into history is a little too early, however, since from what we see today, the man is still actively around, and plans to be around for a whole lot longer. Rather than speculate on who will rule in post-Arafat Palestine, it is better to ask: what will rule the Palestinians if Arafat is gone? The answer: deadlock, chaos, and a complete and tremendous divide within the Palestinian national movement.

Damascus, Syria.
July 25, 2004.

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